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1191 
CELEBRITY NEWSGATHERING AND PRIVACY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF BREACH OF CONFIDENCE IN 
ENGLISH LAW 
John D. McCamus* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Traditional English common law does not recognize invasion of 
privacy as a separate tort.  Although it is accepted that various torts such 
as trespass, nuisance, defamation, and the equitable duty to maintain 
confidences might have the incidental effect of providing such redress in 
particular cases of privacy invasion, the American approach of 
articulating a general principle of tort law providing direct redress for 
privacy invasions has had little appeal.  In the modern era, the traditional 
resistance to this particular modification of tort law has been criticized 
from at least two sources.  First, in contemporary society, the list of 
privacy invasive practices and phenomena that reduce the realm of 
privacy within which individuals conduct their private lives continues to 
grow. Any list of modern developments of this kind would 
nonexclusively include the continuing development of modern 
surveillance technologies, the internet and other data sharing 
technologies, modern marketing practices, the increasingly fine-grained 
intimate personal information produced by medical health technologies, 
the security measures resulting from 9/11, and the War on Terror.  For 
celebrities, the increasingly aggressive newsgathering activities of the 
tabloid press and their associates in the paparazzi photo trade constitute 
what may be an increasing menace.  Privacy advocates’ refrain for the 
last several decades to the effect that privacy is now threatened as never 
before has a continuing ring of truth to it.  Those who have been injured 
by such practices in England, as in America, have frequently turned to 
the courts for redress.  It would be surprising if English courts did not 
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feel some pressure to find new means for redressing injuries of this kind. 
In England, an additional source of pressure emanates from 
European sources.  The European Convention on Human Rights,1 to 
which the United Kingdom is a party, provides as follows in Article 8: 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall no interference by a public authority for the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, or the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.2 
Although the effect of Article 8 of the Convention in requiring the 
United Kingdom to protect privacy is a matter of some subtlety and 
complexity, it is nonetheless widely accepted that with the enactment of 
the Human Rights Act of 1998,3 to which the Convention is appended, 
the Convention provisions, including Article 8, impose at least a duty on 
the courts to apply or interpret existing private law causes of action in a 
manner consistent with the Convention rights.  Thus, for example, in the 
recent cases re-interpreting the elements of the traditional claim for 
breach of confidence, English courts have drawn some support from the 
conceded need to interpret breach of confidence doctrine in a manner 
consistent with Article 8 of the Convention.  Indeed, at least one 
appellate court judge has suggested that the obligation imposed by the 
Human Rights Act on every public authority, including the courts, to act 
consistently with the Convention provides a powerful reason for 
recognizing the existence of the tort of the invasion of privacy.4  As we 
shall see, however, this is not a view that has prevailed. 
In recent years, a series of leading cases have returned to consider 
these questions.  The implications of these decisions for the current 
shape of English law relating to civil redress for privacy invasion are the 
subject of this article.  Surprisingly, perhaps, English courts have 
remained steadfast in their refusal to recognize invasion of privacy as a 
tort and in doing so have quite explicitly declined to rely on American 
 
 1. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Human Rights Act, 1988, c. 42 (U.K.). 
 4. Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., [2001] Q.B. 967, 996-998 (Sedley, L.J) [hereinafter DOUGLAS 
(NO. 1)]. 
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experience in this area.  Rather, English courts have preferred to resist 
innovation of this kind and leave the difficult question of privacy law 
reform to Parliament.  On a number of recent occasions, Parliament has 
reacted by enacting legislation designed to solve the particular problem 
left unsolved by the courts.  At the same time, however, in the last few 
years, English courts have subjected the traditional doctrine of breach of 
confidence to a radical transformation and have recognized what is 
essentially, though not in name, a tort consisting of the unlawful 
publication of sensitive personal information.  The principal application 
of this doctrine to date has been in the context of aggressive news 
gathering activities of the tabloid press targeted at the personal lives of 
celebrities.  After providing an account of these developments, this 
article will briefly consider the adequacy of reformulated breach of 
confidence doctrine as an instrument of redress in such circumstances. 
II.  THE MODERN REJECTION OF THE PRIVACY TORT 
Modern judicial treatment of the English judicial approach to the 
privacy tort can be traced to the decision of Megarry V.-C. in Malone v. 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.5  The plaintiff was an antique 
dealer who had been prosecuted for a number of offences of possession 
of stolen property.  At the initial trial, which ended inconclusively, the 
prosecution indicated that it was relying on certain information obtained 
by the police from wiretapping the plaintiff’s telephone line.  Facing a 
second trial, the plaintiff brought an action seeking to enjoin the further 
use of the material on a variety of grounds including allegations that the 
wiretap was “unlawful and constituted an invasion of his right to 
privacy.”  Although the police wiretap had been made on the basis of a 
warrant issued by the Secretary of State, such warrants had no statutory 
authority, and the plaintiff, accordingly, argued that in the absence of 
such authority the wiretap was unlawful.  The tort claim was advanced 
on the basis that English law should recognize either a general tort of 
invasion of privacy or a more particularized right of privacy concerning 
wiretap surveillance of telephone communications.  More particularly, 
the claimant attempted to draw support from Article 8 of the Convention 
as a basis for recognizing the existence of the civil redress for invasion 
of privacy on tortious grounds.  On the present facts, the only hope for a 
successful claim in tort was the recognition of invasion of privacy as a 
tort.  The physical means by which wiretapping was accomplished in 
 
 5. Malone v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis, [1979] Ch. 344. 
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England at that time was that the police would obtain a warrant from the 
Secretary of State and forward the warrant to the Post Office from which 
location a recording was then made of conversations on the telephone 
line being tapped.  The wiretap did not occur on the premises of the 
plaintiff and thus could not constitute the tort of trespass. 
The plaintiff’s arguments failed across the board.  Megarry V.-C. 
held that the police were entitled to engage in telephone wiretap 
surveillance, even in the absence of statutory authority, provided that the 
means by which it was accomplished did not itself contravene the law.  
As no trespass had occurred, the wiretap was perfectly lawful.  With 
respect to the privacy tort, Megarry V.-C. held that English law 
recognized neither a general privacy tort nor a particular invasion of 
privacy relating to the interception of telephone communications.  
Interestingly, Megarry V.-C. conceded that the fact that such a right had 
not yet been recognized did not necessarily preclude recognition of the 
right.  As he observed: 
I am not unduly troubled by the absence of English authority: there has 
to be a first time for everything, and if the principles of English law, 
and not least analogies from the existing rules, together with the 
requirements of justice and common sense, pointed firmly to such a 
right existing, then I think the court should not be deterred from 
recognizing the right.6 
Recognition of even a limited right to privacy in the context of 
telephone communications did not constitute, however, in Megarry V.-
C.’s view, the mere recognition of a new “right.”  Recognition of such a 
tort, in his view, amounted to a creation by judicial “legislation” of a 
new field of law.  He further noted: 
On the other hand, it is no function of the courts to legislate in a new 
field.  The extension of the existing laws and principles is one thing, 
the creation of an altogether new right is another.  At times judges 
must, and do, legislate; but, as Holmes J. once said, they do so only 
interstitially, and with molecular rather than molar motions[.] . . . 
Anything beyond that must be left for legislation. No new right in the 
law, fully-fledged with all the appropriate safeguards can spring from 
the head of the judge deciding a particular case: only Parliament can 
create such a right.7   
The task of designing such a tort and demanding what exceptions to 
the tort would exist was, in Megarry V.-C.’s view, beyond the 
 
 6. Id. at 372 (citing Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917)). 
 7. Id. 
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capacity or appropriate bounds of judicial innovation.8 
Nor was the European Convention of any assistance.  The 
Convention was a treaty and therefore not justiciable in the Courts of 
England.  The Convention did not have the effect of conferring direct 
rights of civil redress on the plaintiff that could be enforced in an 
English court.  The plaintiff’s further suggestion that the Convention 
might assist in determining the nature of English law on a point of 
difficulty such as the existence of a privacy tort also foundered on the 
shoal of judicial incapacity.  As the jurisprudence under the Convention 
indicated, in Megarry V.C.’s view, the difficulties created by 
unregulated wiretap surveillance could be remedied only by a complex 
legislative response restricting the use of this form of surveillance to 
suitably limited circumstances and providing some independent means 
for authorizing its use in those cases.  The latter task, in particular, was 
well beyond the capacity of the courts.  Giving effect to the argument 
that the Convention should inform judicial interpretation of the common 
law would thus carry a judge “beyond any possible function of the 
Convention as influencing English law that has ever been suggested; and 
it would be most undesirable.”9 
In light of later developments, it is also of passing interest that 
Megarry V.-C. rejected the plaintiff’s further suggestion that the action 
for breach of confidence could be extended to cover the present facts.  In 
Megarry V.-C.’s view, the duty of confidence rests on the existence of a 
confidential relationship.  Thus, “a person who utters confidential 
information must accept the risk of any unknown overhearing that is 
inherent in the circumstances of communication.”10  As illustrations, 
those who exchange confidences on a bus or train, over a garden wall, or 
within earshot of an unseen fellow employee assume the risk of some 
third party acquiring confidential information in such circumstances.  
Megarry V.-C. observed: 
I do not see why someone who has overheard some secret in such a 
way should be exposed to legal proceedings if he uses or divulges what 
he has heard.  No doubt an honourable man would give some warning 
when he realises that what he is hearing is not intended for his ears; but 
I have to concern myself with the law, and not with moral standards.  
There are, of course, many moral precepts which are not legally 
 
 8. See id. 
 9. Id. at 380. 
 10. Id. at 376. 
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enforceable.11 
The possibility of reformulating the duty of breach of confidence in 
such a way as to incorporate some aspects of privacy protection is not an 
idea that appears to have interested Megarry V.-C. on this occasion. 
The pattern of judicial rejection of the privacy tort followed by 
Parliamentary intervention to fill the gap in the law made apparent by 
the particular decision is illustrated in the Malone case.  Shortly after the 
decision in Malone, Parliament addressed the problem by enacting the 
Interception of Communications Act in 1985.12  Similarly, in R. v. Khan 
(Sultan),13 the courts’ failure to recognize that a right to privacy had 
been infringed by deployment of a listening device affixed to a house 
was followed by the enactment of amendments to the Police Act of 1997 
to provide a statutory basis for surveillance of this kind. 
A somewhat more aggressive approach was taken by the English 
Court of Appeal in a case involving telephone harassment.  In 
Khorasandjian v. Bush,14 the plaintiff, a girl of eighteen, sought an 
injunction against a disappointed suitor, five years her senior, who 
engaged in various forms of harassment.  The harassment consisted, in 
part, of telephone harassment of the plaintiff and various members of her 
family.  At trial, the defendant was enjoined from “harassing, pestering 
or communicating with” the plaintiff through the making of unwanted 
phone calls.15  The defendant appealed on the ground that the alleged 
misconduct of “harassing, pestering or communicating” with the 
plaintiff did not constitute any tort known to the law and, more 
particularly, represented an attempt to introduce a tort of invasion of 
privacy.  The Court of Appeal held, however, that the defendant’s 
telephone harassment constituted the tort of nuisance in the sense of an 
actual interference with the ordinary and reasonable use and enjoyment 
of property, even though the plaintiff was not the legal owner of the 
property in question.  Drawing some support from a Canadian authority 
granting such relief to an owner of property, the court held that similar 
protection could be afforded to the non-owner plaintiff in the 
circumstances of this case.16  Dillon L.J., for a majority of the court, 
reasoned as follows: 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Interception of Communications Act, 1985, c. 56 (U.K.). 
 13. R v. Khan (Sultan), [1997] (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 14. Khorasandjian v. Bush, [1993] Q.B. 727, 731 (C.A.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 734 (citing Motherwell v. Motherwell, [1976] 1 A.R. 47). 
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To my mind, it is ridiculous if in this present age the law is that the 
making of deliberately harassing and pestering telephone calls to a 
person is only actionable in the civil courts if the recipient of the calls 
happens to have the freehold or a leasehold proprietary interest in the 
premises in which he or she has received the calls.17 
Although this decision might be thought to constitute a small but 
significant step forward in the recognition of privacy interests, the House 
of Lords held, in a subsequent nuisance decision, that the tort of private 
nuisance could be maintained only by a plaintiff having an ownership 
interest in the affected property and that the Khorasandjian case, on this 
ground, was incorrectly decided.18  Again, Parliament intervened in 1997 
with the Protection from Harassment Act.19 
The prospect of recognizing the existence of a tort of invasion of 
privacy surfaced for consideration by the House of Lords in the recent 
decision in Wainwright v. Home Office, a case involving an unlawful 
strip-search by prison officials conducted upon relatives of a prisoner.20  
Prison officials were suspicious that the prisoner in question was dealing 
in drugs and were concerned with determining how he might be 
obtaining his supply.  Accordingly, when the plaintiffs, the mother and 
the brother of the prisoner, paid a visit to the prison, they were subjected 
to a strip-search to which the plaintiffs had reluctantly agreed.  Although 
the prison officers were considered to have acted in good faith, the 
searches failed to comply with the applicable administrative rules in 
various respects and, with respect to the son, the search included an 
investigation and touching of his private parts.  The plaintiffs alleged 
that they found the experience quite distressing.  In the case of the 
brother, a psychiatrist testified that the brother had suffered post-
traumatic stress disorder.  As the strip-searches had not been conducted 
in accord with the applicable rules, they were not protected by statutory 
authority.  Accordingly, it was material to consider whether the conduct 
of the searches constituted tortious wrongdoing.  Although the defendant 
Crown did not contest that the touching of the defendant constituted a 
battery, for which damages could be appropriately awarded, the 
defendant contested the proposition that the conduct of the searches was 
otherwise tortious.  Counsel for the plaintiffs advanced the broader claim 
on two grounds.  First, it was urged that in order to comply with its 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1997] A.C. 655 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 19. Protection from Harassment Act, 1997, c. 40 (Eng.). 
 20. Wainright v. Home Office, [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 A.C. 406 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(U.K.). 
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Convention obligations, the House of Lords should declare that the 
common law embraces and, in theory at least, always has embraced a 
tort of invasion of privacy under which the searches of both plaintiffs 
were tortious.  On this basis the plaintiffs were entitled to damages for 
the mental distress suffered by the mother and, in the son’s case, the 
psychiatric injury caused by the search.  Alternatively, the plaintiff 
proposed that if so bold a step could not be taken, relief could be 
grounded on a modest extension of the tort of intentional infliction of 
mental harm.21 
In rejecting, once again, the proposition that English law should 
consider the tort of invasion of privacy, the House of Lords specifically 
alluded to the American experience in this area.  In the leading opinion, 
Lord Hoffmann referred to privacy as “the right to be left alone,” 
defined in the famous article by Warren and Brandeis, and noted the 
authors’ thesis that identifying the common element of privacy invasion 
would enable the courts to pronounce the existence of a general 
principle, “which protected a person’s appearance, sayings, acts and 
personal relations from being exposed in public.”22  Lord Hoffmann 
further observed that American courts had been receptive to this 
suggestion and developed an extensive American jurisprudence of the 
privacy tort.  Lord Hoffmann additionally noted Prosser’s four part 
taxonomy of the privacy tort: (i) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s physical 
solitude or seclusion (including unlawful searches, telephone tapping, 
long distance photography and telephone harassment); (ii) public 
disclosure of private facts; (iii) publicity putting the plaintiff in a false 
light; and (iv) appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the 
plaintiff’s name or likeness.23  One who favored recognition of the 
privacy tort in English law might have found Prosser’s analysis 
illuminating and helpful in the sense that it demonstrates that the tort, 
properly viewed, is not so vague and amorphous as to suffer from 
incurable uncertainty.  For Lord Hoffmann, however, American 
experience was such as to demonstrate the invalidity of the American 
approach.  He reasoned as follows: 
The need in the United States to break down the concept of ‘invasion 
of privacy’ into a number of loosely-linked torts must cast doubt upon 
the value of any high-level generalization which can perform a useful 
 
 21. Id. at 424-26 (discussing Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57). 
 22. Id. at 419 (Lord Hoffmann) (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890)). 
 23. Id. (noting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 804-14 (4th ed. 
1971)). 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 4, Art. 13
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss4/13
MCCAMUSFINAL.DOC 2/26/2007  9:46:24 AM 
2006] TRANSFORMATION OF BREACH OF CONFIDENCE 1199 
function in enabling one to deduce the rule to be applied in a concrete 
case.  English law has so far been unwilling, perhaps unable, to 
formulate any such high-level principle . . . . what the courts have so 
far refused to do is to formulate a general principle of “invasion of 
privacy” (I use the quotation marks to signal my doubt about what in 
such a context the expression would mean) from which the conditions 
of liability in the particular case can be deduced.24 
For this view, Lord Hoffmann drew support from the analysis 
offered by Megarry V.-C. in the Malone case and provided an account of 
the modern history, recounted in part above, of English judicial 
decisions rejecting the existence of the privacy tort and the subsequent 
enactment of legislation by Parliament to fill in gaps in the common 
law.25  For Lord Hoffmann, this seemed a satisfactory approach.  In his 
view and notwithstanding the American experience in this area, 
recognition of a broad privacy tort was simply inconsistent with the 
common law method.  Manifesting some similarities to the reasoning of 
Megarry V.-C. in Malone, Lord Hoffmann opined that a principle in 
favor of privacy protection was incapable of being formulated in the 
form of a “rule.”  As he stated, 
There seems to me a great difference between identifying privacy as a 
value which underlies the existence of a rule of law (and may point the 
direction in which the law should develop) and privacy as as principle 
of law in itself.  The English common law is familiar with the notion of 
underlying values – principles only in the broadest sense – which 
directed its development.  A famous example is [a decision of the 
House of Lords] in which freedom of speech was the underlying value 
which supported the decision to lay down the specific rule that a local 
authority could not sue for libel.  But no one has suggested that 
freedom of speech is in itself a legal principle which is capable of 
sufficient definition to enable one to deduce specific rules to be applied 
in concrete cases.  That is not the way the common law works.26 
Nor, in his view, could support for the recognition of such a tort be 
drawn either from the Convention or from the 1998 legislation requiring 
“public authorities” to act compatibly with Convention rights.27  The 
latter legislation, by creating a statutory right of redress in cases where 
public authorities act inconsistently with the Convention, weakened the 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 419-22 (citing Malone v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis, [1979] Ch. 344, 372-
81). 
 26. Id. at 423. 
 27. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, s. 6 (U.K.). 
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argument for recognizing a general tort of invasion of privacy since it 
would pre-empt the controversial question of whether such remedies 
should to be extended into the private sector. 
In Wainwright, then, the House of Lords endorsed, with apparent 
enthusiasm, the recent history of judicial rejection of the privacy tort.  
The court accepted the proposition that civil redress of privacy invasion, 
to the extent that it falls outside existing common law torts and statutory 
initiatives, is a matter best left for the legislature.  Indeed, in 
Wainwright, the somewhat extreme claim is made that the recognition of 
a privacy tort is simply inconsistent with the common law method.  
Against this background, one would have little reason to anticipate or 
predict that the existing law of breach of confidence might soon be 
dramatically transformed with a view to extending hitherto 
unprecedented protection of privacy interests through evolution of the 
common law. 
III.  CELEBRITY NEWSGATHERING AND PRIVACY 
On November 18, 2000, the American Film Stars Michael Douglas 
and Catherine Zeta-Jones wed in New York.  The wedding was held in 
the Plaza Hotel and was presumably followed by a lavish reception, to 
which nearly 350 guests had been invited.  The engagement of the 
couple had been announced earlier that year and was the subject of some 
interest in the popular press.  Douglas and Zeta-Jones were approached 
by two British tabloids, Hello! and OK!, rival publications in the tabloid 
market, for the exclusive right to publish photographs of the wedding 
reception.  After a period of negotiations, the couple entered into an 
agreement with OK! a week or so before the wedding.  Under the 
agreement, OK! agreed to pay £500,000 each to Mr. Douglas and Ms. 
Zeta-Jones in return for the exclusive right to publish the wedding 
photographs for a period of nine months.  The couple retained the right 
to control the selection of photographs to be published and undertook to 
“use their best endeavours” to ensure that no other media organization 
was permitted access to the celebration and that no photographs would 
be taken by guests or other persons present at the event other than the 
photographers retained by the couple.  Pursuant to this obligation, the 
arrangements made by the couple for the celebration included a clear 
statement on the invitation that no photographs were to be taken at the 
event, security arrangements for the hotel and, the day before the event, 
issuance of security cards designed to restrict access to the reception to 
10
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invited guests.28 
Notwithstanding these arrangements, an unauthorized photo-
journalist was able to insinuate himself into the reception where he 
surreptitiously took a number of photographs of the event, including 
pictures of Douglas and Zeta-Jones.  Subsequently, the photographer in 
question sold these photographs to OK!’s rival, Hello! Magazine, for 
£125,000.  Hello! then commenced the preparation of its next issue, 
which would include the unauthorized photographs and “scoop” OK!.  
Prior to publication, OK! learned that the unauthorized photographs were 
being peddled on the market and, in due course, became aware that they 
had been purchased by Hello!.  Allegedly shocked by these revelations, 
Douglas and Zeta-Jones joined with OK! in launching proceedings in 
London seeking to enjoin Hello! from the publication of the 
photographs.  At the same time, OK! advanced the date for its own 
publication of the photographs and elicited cooperation from Douglas 
and Zeta-Jones in achieving this objective.  Although an interim 
injunction was granted at the first instance, the injunction was lifted by 
the Court of Appeal on the basis, principally, that, assuming that a valid 
cause of action against Hello! would arise in these circumstances, the 
interests of the plaintiffs would be adequately protected by an award of 
damages at trial.  In the event, the wedding issue of OK! magazine went 
on sale the very same day as the issue of Hello! containing the 
unauthorized photographs.  In due course, the matter proceeded to trial 
and a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs was recently affirmed by the 
English Court of Appeal.29 
On February 1, 2001, the internationally successfully fashion model 
Naomi Campbell was the subject of unwanted and unattractive publicity 
in the London newspaper, the Daily Mirror.  Ms. Campbell had, on 
previous occasions, publicly declared that she, unlike others in her 
industry, did not suffer from drug or alcohol addiction.  The story in the 
Mirror painted a different picture under the front page headline “Naomi: 
I am a Drug Addict,”30 with the story indicating that Ms. Campbell was 
attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings in a courageous attempt to 
defeat her addiction to alcohol and drugs.  The article went on to 
describe the duration and frequency of her attendance at such meetings 
and the manner in which she was treated by fellow attendees.  The story 
was accompanied by a picture of the “supermodel” and “catwalk queen” 
 
 28. DOUGLAS (NO. 1), supra note 4, at 975-76. 
 29. Douglas v. Hello! Limited, [2006] Q.B. 125 [hereinafter DOUGLAS (NO. 3)]. 
 30. Campbell v. M.G.N. Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, 462. 
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casually dressed and said to be emerging from a “grueling two-hour 
session” at Narcotics Anonymous.31  Although the faces of alleged 
friends were pixilated, the famous Ms. Campbell was plainly visible.  
The article could be portrayed as a somewhat sympathetic account of 
Ms. Campbell’s courageous battle with her addictions.  At the same 
time, however, the article did not refrain from drawing attention to her 
prior public falsehoods on this topic.  On the same day as this coverage 
appeared in the Mirror, Ms. Campbell commenced an action for 
damages against the defendant publisher of the Mirror.  A modest award 
of damages (£3,500) in her favor at trial was overturned by the Court of 
Appeal.  The Court of Appeal’s decision was, however, reversed by the 
House of Lords in what has become the leading English decision on 
privacy protection issues in the context of celebrity newsgathering.32 
Against the background of the modern rejection of the privacy tort 
by English courts, one might have assumed that the prospects for success 
in the claims brought by Douglas, Zeta-Jones, and Campbell, at least to 
the extent that they rested on alleged invasions of privacy interests, 
would be insubstantial.  If the unauthorized strip-search of Mrs. 
Wainwright,33 the persistent telephone harassment of Ms. 
Khorasandjian,34 and the unregulated use of wiretap surveillance by law 
enforcement authorities did not warrant civil redress,35 how likely was it 
that English courts would find a basis for protecting the interests of 
Douglas and Zeta-Jones in preserving control over the use of 
photographs of their wedding reception or the interest of Campbell in 
preserving secrecy concerning a medical condition about which she had 
lied to the public?  The claims of Douglas and Zeta-Jones may appear 
particularly fragile.  Non-celebrities can only imagine the level of 
distress sustained by the couple when confronted by the alleged invasion 
of privacy that would result from the publication of unauthorized 
photographs of their wedding.  The trial judge, however, was satisfied 
that such distress had occurred, and the modest award of £3,750 each to 
the plaintiffs with respect to that distress was not successfully challenged 
on appeal.  More easily imagined, however, is the concern that the 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 458-59. 
 33. Wainwright v. Home Office, [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 A.C. 406 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (U.K.). 
 34. Khorasandjian v. Bush , [1993] Q.B. 727 (C.A.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 35. Malone v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis, [1979] Ch. 344.  While it is true that the 
use of such surveillance by the police was regulated on a non-statutory basis by the issuance of 
warrants by the Secretary of State, the existence of an informal regulatory scheme of this kind was 
not central to the court’s decision to deny civil redress. 
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couple may well have experienced to preserve the commercial value of 
the wedding photographs which had been handsomely paid for by OK!.  
At the same time, however, the fact that Douglas and Zeta-Jones had 
sold the right, albeit an exclusive one, to publish their wedding 
photographs to OK! might be thought to undermine any suggestion that 
the publication of unauthorized photographs by Hello! constituted an 
invasion of their privacy.  Although the claim of Ms. Campbell to be 
able to preserve confidentiality with respect to her addiction presents a 
substantially more sympathetic case, her prior public falsehoods on the 
subject might be thought to significantly undermine her claim to remain 
immune from press coverage on this subject.  Indeed, the right of the 
press to publish information inconsistent with her prior statements was 
not seriously challenged in the Campbell litigation.  The plaintiffs in 
each case, however, enjoyed success, though not on the basis of a newly 
recognized privacy tort.  Rather, success was achieved on the basis of a 
substantially reformed doctrine of breach of confidence which would 
appear, other than in name, to afford protection for what would be 
considered, in American law, to constitute invasions of privacy interests. 
IV.  THE TRANSFORMATION OF BREACH OF CONFIDENCE 
The traditional doctrine of breach of confidence affords protection 
against the abuse or misuse of information which is given to another in 
confidence.36  The duty to maintain a confidence may arise out of a 
fiduciary or contractual relationship, but the duty may arise in other 
circumstances as well.  Thus, for example, the disclosure of confidential 
information in the course of the negotiations towards a contract may 
give rise to such a duty.  The classic modern statement of the doctrine is 
that of Megarry J. in Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd.37  The three 
elements that give rise to the duty were described by Megarry J. in the 
following terms: 
First, the information itself, . . . must “have the necessary quality of 
confidence about it.” Secondly, that information must have been 
imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. 
Thirdly, there must be an unauthorized use of that information to the 
detriment of the party communicating it.38 
 
 36. See generally, PETER D. MADDAUGH & JOHN D. MCCAMUS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 
28, 891 (2d ed. 2004); R. GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 749 (6th ed. 2002); 
FRANCIS GURRY, BREACH OF CONFIDENCE (1925). 
 37. Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd., [1968] F.S.R. 415 (Ch.). 
 38. Id. at 419. 
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If the person to whom the information has been confided abuses or 
misuses the information, a broad range of remedies is available to the 
person who confided the information, including an injunction and/or an 
accounting of profits secured through use of the information or 
damages.39  The principal obstacle to the deployment of breach of 
confidence analysis in the context of celebrity newsgathering is the first 
requirement concerning the existence of the confidential relationship.  
The traditional breach of confidence duty protects confidential 
relationships rather than confidential or private information per se.  The 
essence of the wrong lies in the misuse of information disclosed in the 
context of a confidential relationship where the person to whom the 
information has been confided either understands or ought to understand 
the existence of the duty to maintain the confidence.  Moreover, in the 
typical case, far from a confidential disclosure of information by the 
celebrity, the information has typically been gathered by the journalist, 
through assiduous research or, indeed, aggressive invasions of the 
privacy of the celebrity.  In the typical case of celebrity newsgathering, 
then, the journalist may have no relationship whatsoever with the 
celebrity in question.  It would be highly artificial to characterize the 
situation as one in which the celebrity disclosed information in 
circumstances where the journalist would reasonably expect that the 
information was confidential and that the confidence should be 
maintained.  It is thus only by reducing or, indeed, eliminating the 
requirement of a pre-existing confidential relationship that breach of 
confidence can become a satisfactory instrument for protecting the use 
or misuse of personal information simply on the basis that the 
information is of a highly sensitive and confidential nature.  The 
difficulty with eliminating the requirement of confidential relationship, 
however, is that the traditional nature of the duty of confidence is 
substantially transformed and becomes indistinguishable from what 
might more properly be referred to as a duty to avoid invasion of the 
privacy of the celebrity target. 
The seeds of a dramatic transformation of breach of confidence of 
this kind were sown by Lord Goff in Attorney-General v. Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd., a case involving the publication of the indiscreet 
memoirs of a secret service agent written by the agent in breach of a 
duty of confidence. 40  Lord Goff noted that the duty of confidence 
normally arises in the context of an existing confidential relationship 
 
 39. See supra note 36.  
 40. Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd., [1990] 1 A.C. 109 (H.L.). 
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where the information is disclosed by a “confider” to a “confidant.”  
Lord Goff went on to observe, however, in a radically pregnant dictum, 
that the duty applies more broadly to include circumstances where 
confidential information is, in some sense, accidentally disclosed.  He 
observed as follows: 
But it is well settled that a duty of confidence may arise in equity 
independently of such cases; and I have expressed the circumstances in 
which the duty arises in broad terms, not merely to embrace those 
cases where a third party receives information from a person who is 
under a duty of confidence in respect of it, knowing that it has been 
disclosed by that person to him in breach of his duty of confidence, but 
also to include certain situations, beloved of law teachers – where an 
obviously confidential doctrine is wafted by an electric fan out of a 
window into a crowded street, or where an obviously confidential 
document, such as a private diary, is dropped in a public place, and is 
then picked up by a passer-by.41 
Although Lord Goff offered no authority for this proposition, other 
than lecture hall speculation, the door was thus opened to a rather more 
comprehensive deployment of the doctrine of breach of confidence in 
the context of improper use of confidential or private information 
accidentally acquired in the absence of a pre-existing relationship with 
the subject of the information.  The duty to refrain from subsequent use 
of the misplaced diary must arise, if at all, from the obviously private 
and sensitive nature of the information contained therein. 
Although the significance of Lord Goff’s hypothesis for the 
possible expansion of the duty of confidence appears not to have been 
appreciated for a period of time,42 the possibility was explored at 
considerable length in the proceedings concerning the interlocutory 
injunction in Douglas v. Hello! Ltd (No. 1).43  As Sedley, L.J. noted, 
application of the traditional doctrine of breach of confidence to the 
Douglas/Zeta-Jones wedding was problematic because “it is possible 
that the photographer was an intruder with whom no relationship of trust 
had been established.”44  If, on the other hand, the misuse of information 
that had been perpetrated by a guest or employee with whom the couple 
had a relationship of confidence, the traditional doctrine would apply.  
Both Sedley and Keene, LL.J. contended that breach of confidence no 
 
 41. Id. at 281. 
 42. But see Hellewell v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire, [1995] 4 All E.R. 473 at p. 476 per 
Laws J. 
 43. DOUGLAS (No. 1), supra note 4. 
 44. Id. at 998. 
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longer required the establishment of a pre-existing relationship of 
confidence.  Sedley, L.J., in particular, argued that this recent 
development of the law of breach of confidence was rendered desirable 
by the “increasingly invasive social environment in contemporary 
society.”45  Further, Sedley, L.J. drew support from the Human Rights 
Act of 1998 that requires the courts to give appropriate effect to the right 
to privacy set out in Article 8 of the European Convention.46  Indeed, for 
Sedley, L.J., the time had arrived for the recognition of an explicit 
privacy right.  He reasoned as follows: 
What a concept of privacy does . . . is accord recognition to the fact 
that the law has to protect not only those people whose trust has been 
abused but those who simply find themselves subjected to an unwanted 
intrusion into their personal lives.  The law no longer needs to 
construct an artificial relationship of confidentiality between intruder 
and victim; it can recognize privacy itself as a legal principle drawn 
from the fundamental value of personal autonomy.47 
Similarly, Keene, L.J. suggested that:  
[w]hether the resulting liability is described as being for breach of 
confidence or breach of a right to privacy may be a little more than 
deciding which label is to be attached to the cause of action, but there 
would seem to be merit in recognizing that the original concept of 
breach of confidence has in this particular category of cases now 
developed into something different from the commercial and 
employment relationships with which confidentiality is mainly 
concerned.48 
To the extent that these comments offer support for the direct 
recognition of a privacy tort, however, they have not survived the 
subsequent decision of the House of Lords in Wainwright v. Home 
Office,49 in which the possibility of recognizing a new tort of privacy 
invasion was plainly rejected.  Notwithstanding the court’s embrace of 
Lord Goff’s expansion of breach of confidence, the interlocutory 
injunction was lifted on the ground that damages at trial would, in any 
event, provide an adequate remedy for any alleged infringement of the 
plaintiffs’ interests. 
 
 45. Id. at 997. 
 46. Id.; see supra, note 1. 
 47. DOUGLAS NO. 1, supra note 4, at 1001. 
 48. Id. at 1012. 
 49. Wainwright v. Home Office, [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 A.C. 406 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (U.K.). 
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The notion that the action for breach of confidence might be 
extended to circumstances where no pre-existing relationship of 
confidence existed, however, has enjoyed much greater success.  Indeed, 
in the immediate aftermath of this decision of the Court of Appeal, 
another judge enjoined the disclosure of information by a newspaper 
concerning the location of two youths who had been convicted of the 
murder of a two year old child upon their release from a period of 
imprisonment.50  The proposed new version of the duty of confidence 
provided the means for redress for Naomi Campbell in her suit against 
the publishers of the Daily Mirror.51  The claim in Campbell v. M.G.N. 
Ltd. was framed in terms of breach of confidence rather than invasion of 
privacy. 52  The House of Lords, although divided with respect to the 
result in this case, was unanimous in holding that an extended version of 
the duty of confidence was now applicable to fact situations of this kind.  
Lord Hoffmann summarized recent developments in the following 
terms: 
In recent years . . . there have been two developments of the law of 
confidence, typical of the capacity of the common law to adapt itself to 
the needs of contemporary life.  One has been an acknowledgement of 
the artificiality of distinguishing between confidential information 
obtained through the violation of a confidential relationship and similar 
information obtained in some other way.  The second has been the 
acceptance, under the influence of human rights instruments such as 
Article 8 of the European Convention, of the privacy of personal 
information as something worthy of protection in its own right.53 
A majority of the panel was convinced that the expanded duty of 
confidence was applicable to some but not all of the information 
concerning Ms. Campbell that had been published by the Mirror.  It was 
not seriously contested by the plaintiff that Ms. Campbell’s prior false 
statements concerning her lack of addiction precluded her from 
contesting the publication of the information that she suffered a drug 
addiction and that she was receiving treatment for it.  The majority of the 
court, however, was of the view that the details concerning the nature of 
the treatment at Narcotics Anonymous, the details of the duration and 
frequency of her attendance, and the pictorial portrayal of her leaving a 
 
 50. Venables v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2001] Fam. 430.  In A v. B,  [2003] Q.B. 195, 
however, an attempt to enjoin publicity concerning the adulterous affairs of a celebrity footballer 
failed.  See also Theakston v. M.G.N. Ltd., [2002] E.M.L.R. 22. 
 51. Campbell v. M.G.N., Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 472. 
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meeting with other addicts crossed the line of information protected by 
the expanded version of the breach of confidence doctrine.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the majority drew support from a consideration that the 
private nature of Narcotics Anonymous meetings was essential.  Addicts 
would be encouraged to attend such meetings if they believed that they 
could do so anonymously.  Accordingly, the therapy was placed at risk if 
the details of attendance at such meetings were made public.  The House 
of Lords was divided, however, on the significance to be attached to 
another fundamental value secured by Article 10 of the European 
Convention, the article enshrining protection of the freedom of the press.  
For the majority, the right to privacy lying at the heart of the action of 
the breach of confidence had to be balanced against the right of the 
media to impart information to the public.  In striking that balance, it 
was appropriate to consider whether the benefits that would be achieved 
by publication were proportionate to the harm that might be done by 
interfering with the privacy right.  Applying that test, the majority 
agreed with the trial judge that the infringement of Ms. Campbell’s 
privacy interests should weigh more heavily than the press’s interest in 
being able to publish information concerning the nature of her addiction 
treatment. 
V.  PRIVACY AND BREACH OF CONFIDENCE: A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND 
HOLE? 
The reformulation of the duty to maintain confidences into what is 
essentially a privacy tort by another name may be thought to 
demonstrate the resilience of the English common law and its capacity 
for fruitful modification or development.  In the very shadow of the 
recent decision of the House of Lords in Wainwright and its rejection of 
the validity of the privacy tort, the emergence of breach of confidence as 
a potentially vigorous form of civil redress for privacy invasion offers 
interesting and compelling evidence of the suppleness of the common 
law.  It may be seriously questioned, however, whether transformation 
of the duty to maintain confidences is a satisfactory means for achieving 
the objective of providing civil redress for newsgathering practices that 
are unacceptably invasive of personal privacy.  Thus transformed, it may 
be that breach of confidence no longer directly accomplishes the 
objectives of the traditional breach of confidence claim.  Moreover, an 
overly intense connection with traditional breach of confidence analysis 
may impair understanding and development of the new privacy claim. 
One may begin by noting that even in its traditional form, breach of 
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confidence was one of a number of causes of action that, in particular 
circumstances, could have the effect of protecting privacy interests.  
Although the typical breach of confidence case involves the transfer of 
confidential commercial information in the context of contractual 
negotiations, it is also well established that breach of confidence analysis 
can apply to personal information of a private nature.  Thus, in the 
leading case of Prince Albert v. Strange, Prince Albert successfully 
enjoined a domestic servant from publishing a catalogue of etchings that 
he and Queen Victoria had made.54  Although the case is a leading 
illustration of the application of the traditional duty of confidence, it is 
evident that the effect of the holding was, and was intended to be, the 
protection of the privacy of the royal family.  In the more usual context 
of the disclosure of confidential commercial information in the context 
of contractual negotiations, there are obviously no similar privacy 
interests at issue.  This important fact points toward a fundamental 
distinction between traditional breach of confidence and the protection 
of privacy interests.   
The fundamental rationale of confidence doctrine is not the 
protection of privacy but, rather, the protection of relationships of 
confidence.  Although the elaboration of that rationale might take 
various forms, it is not likely to be contentious to suggest that the reason 
for protecting such relationships is to facilitate the disclosure of 
information in confidence and to give effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the confider and the confidant in such circumstances.  
Further, the duty to maintain confidences preserves the commercial 
value of the information disclosed.  The rationale of privacy based tort 
duties, on the other hand, is to preserve the confidentiality of personal 
information with a view to enhancing the ability of individuals to avoid 
unwarranted intrusions into their private lives and to maintain control 
over the disclosure of personal information of an intimate nature.  Loss 
of such control threatens the moral autonomy of individuals and 
undermines the quality of their private lives. From a privacy perspective, 
then, it is not essential that the personal information has been initially 
disclosed in the context of a confidential relationship.  The acquisition of 
the personal information, through the use of a telephoto lens or other 
means of electronic surveillance, is equally offensive to the privacy 
value.  Moreover, the type of information protected by the two different 
rationales for redress is importantly different.  The protection of privacy 
rationale is targeted at the improper disclosure of personal information, 
 
 54. Prince Albert v. Strange, (1849) 2 De G. & Sm. 652, 64 E.R. 293. 
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especially information of an intimate nature, disclosure of which could 
cause embarrassment or harm to the individual in question.  In the 
breach of confidence cases, the confidential information protected is 
rarely of this kind, although the protected information must be 
“confidential” in the sense that it is not “something which is public 
property and public knowledge.”55  In the typical case, the information at 
issue has commercial value that may be improperly exploited by the 
confidant. 
These fundamental differences between the breach of confidence 
and privacy protection rationales suggest that the abandonment of the 
relationship of confidence requirement of the traditional breach of 
confidence doctrine would seriously undermine the ability of the 
doctrine to give effect to its underlining objectives.  It seems rather 
likely, then, that in factual situations traditionally considered to give rise 
to a duty of confidence, courts will continue to apply the traditional 
breach of confidence doctrine, including the requirement that the 
information that has been disclosed in circumstances “importing an 
obligation of confidence.”56  On this basis, we should assume that 
English law now embraces two forms of breach of confidence doctrine, 
the second relating to issues of privacy protection rather than breach of 
the duty of confidence.  In attempting to ascertain whether this new and 
second form of breach of confidence in English law truly is aimed at the 
protection of privacy interests, it will be of interest to attempt to 
determine whether the rationale for the relief offered in cases like 
Douglas and Campbell is rooted in privacy protection rather than breach 
of confidence and whether the nature of the information protected is 
consistent with a privacy protection rather than a breach of confidence 
rationale. 
The opinions of the House of Lords in the Campbell case and the 
leading opinion of Lord Phillips in the more recent decision of the Court 
of Appeal in the appeal from the trial of the issue in Douglas v. Hello! 
Ltd. (No. 2) strongly suggest that a privacy protection rationale underlies 
the relief accorded in these cases under the banner of breach of 
confidence.  In Campbell, Lord Hoffmann observed that human rights 
law had identified private information “as something worth protecting as 
an aspect of human autonomy and dignity.”57  He further noted the 
following: 
 
 55. Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd. [1963] 3 All E.R. 413 
(NOTE), (1948), 65 R.P.C. 203 (C.A.) 203, 215 (Lord Greene M.R.). 
 56. See supra note 36. 
 57. Campbell, 2 A.C. at 472. 
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The new approach [to breach of confidence] takes a different view of 
the underlying value which the law protects.  Instead of the cause of 
action being based upon the duty of good faith applicable to 
confidential personal information and trade secrets alike, it focuses 
upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity – the right to 
control the dissemination of information about one’s private life and 
the right to the esteem and respect of other people.58 
Moreover, the reasoning of the court supporting the majority view 
that publication of the information concerning Ms. Campbell’s addiction 
treatment was strongly rooted in personal autonomy rather than breach 
of confidence terms.  Disclosure of the information was harmful to Ms. 
Campbell and others similarly positioned because it might discourage 
them from seeking addiction treatment of this kind.  Disclosure thus has 
a harmful effect on the personal autonomy of individuals in need of drug 
rehabilitation.  Further the disclosure was said to be one which would be 
“distressing and highly offensive.”59   
Another view of the rationale for relief on the facts of the Campbell 
case was possible.  The information acquired by the Mirror must surely 
have come from one of Ms. Campbell’s fellow patients or from a 
member of the staff at the clinic.  It is well established law that one who 
receives confidential information innocently but nonetheless becomes 
aware that the information was originally given in confidence can be 
restrained from breaching the confidence.60  It is of some significance, 
then, that the rationale articulated by the House of Lords for granting 
relief in Campbell rests on privacy rather than on traditional breach of 
confidence rationales. 
Further, in Campbell, the House of Lords plainly shifted the focus 
of concern from confidential information of the kind protected by the 
traditional breach of confidence doctrine to personal information of a 
private nature.  Thus, in Campbell, Lord Nicholls observed: 
The continuing use of the phrase “duty of confidence” and the 
description of the information as “confidential” is not altogether 
comfortable.  Information about an individual’s private life would not, 
in ordinary usage, be called “confidential.”  The more natural 
description today is that such information is private.61 
In order to determine whether such information is private in the 
 
 58. Id. (referring to Sedley, LJ’s observations in DOUGLAS (NO.1)). 
 59. Id. at 484 (Hope, L.). 
 60. Fraser v. Evans, [1969] 1 Q.B. 349, 361 (C.A.) (Lord Denning M.R.). 
 61. Campbell, 2 A.C. at 465. 
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requisite sense, a rule aimed at privacy protection (but not at breach of 
confidence) must develop a means for distinguishing sensitive personal 
information from that which can be publicized without harm.  In 
Campbell, the House of Lords also developed such a test.  Borrowing 
indirectly from American law,62 Lord Hope was of the view that the 
information must be of a kind that would make its disclosure “highly 
offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.”63  Lord Hope 
added the gloss that Ms. Campbell’s privacy interest was to be 
determined by considering whether a reasonable person in need of 
medical treatment would consider the disclosure to be objectionable in 
the requisite sense. 
Similarly, in Douglas v. Hello!,64 Lord Phillips emphasized the 
privacy protection rationale of the relief being afforded and the private 
rather than confidential nature of the information being disclosed.65  
Application of the new version of breach of confidence to the facts of 
Douglas v. Hello! may, however, appear problematic.  The Court of 
Appeal concluded that the photographs of the wedding “plainly 
portrayed aspects of the Douglases’ private life”66 and that the 
publication of the unauthorized pictures would lead them to “reasonably 
feel distress.”67  Further, the fact the Douglases had contracted to publish 
authorized photographs of the wedding in another tabloid did not 
constitute a defense to the claim.  On this point, however, the court 
appeared to revert more to the traditional breach of confidence analysis.  
The Court of Appeal articulated the following principle, which distinctly 
had a breach of confidence rather than privacy protection rationale: 
Where an individual (“the owner”) has at his disposal information 
which he has created or which is private or personal and to which he 
can properly deny access to third parties, and he reasonably intends to 
profit commercially by using or publishing that information, then a 
third party who is, or ought to be, aware of these matters and who has 
knowingly obtained the information without authority, will be in 
breach of duty if he uses or publishes the information to the detriment 
of the owner.68 
 
 62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(D) (1997); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 
CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
 63. Campbell, 2 A.C. at 483. 
 64. DOUGLAS (NO. 3), supra note 29. 
 65. Id. at 152-53. 
 66. Id. at 159. 
 67. Id. at 162. 
 68. Id. at 165. 
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The Court of Appeal upheld an award of damages to Douglas and 
Zeta-Jones on this basis.  The unauthorized photographer and the 
defendant publisher both must have been aware of the arrangements 
undertaken by the plaintiffs to secure the confidentiality of the 
information.  Publication of the unauthorized photographs constituted a 
breach of confidence.  It nonetheless remains difficult to sustain the 
argument that disclosure of the unauthorized photographs constitutes the 
publication of personal information of a kind likely to cause distress in 
the context of a celebrity wedding. 
These modern British authorities, then, reflect a somewhat uneasy 
tension between a modern privacy-based tort analysis and traditional 
breach of confidence reasoning.  Given the fundamental dissimilarities 
between breach of confidence and privacy protection analysis, it may be 
that the path to clearer analysis of celebrity newsgathering cases in 
English law lies in the direction of a clearer shift from breach of 
confidence analysis to privacy protection analysis than has yet occurred 
in the recent cases. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This article has traced the history of English common law doctrine 
in recent decades concerning civil redress for injuries resulting from the 
invasion of privacy.  This history represents a curious amalgam of 
resistance to change and a capacity for radical reform.  The former 
tendency was most obviously evident in the reaffirmation by the House 
of Lords of the traditional English position that invasion of privacy, per 
se, does not constitute a tort.  The capacity to radically reform a 
traditional doctrine of English common law is manifest in the expansion 
of the duty of confidence in such fashion as to provide civil redress for a 
particular type of privacy invasion.  In effect, English law has achieved 
indirectly, through expansion of the breach of confidence doctrine, what 
could not be accomplished directly through recognition of invasion of 
privacy as a tort.  Although the reform of well-established common law 
doctrine through indirect means is a familiar form of common law 
evolution, the resulting doctrine provides yet another illustration of the 
wisdom contained in Llewellyn’s memorable aphorism, “Covert tools 
are never reliable tools.”69  A number of difficulties will need to be 
addressed. 
First, the relationship between the old and traditional doctrine of 
 
 69. Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939). 
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breach of confidence and the new reformulated version remains unclear.  
As we have seen, the reasoning in cases such as Douglas70 and 
Campbell71 strongly suggests that the new breach of confidence doctrine 
is not simply a revised version of traditional breach of confidence but 
rather a new and separate doctrine which will apply principally to cases, 
to which the traditional doctrine is inapplicable.  Nonetheless, the 
traditional doctrine remains standing and presumably will continue to 
apply to the kinds of cases to which it has traditionally applied.  Thus, 
where, for example, commercially valuable information is disclosed in 
the course of contractual negotiations, counsel will look to the traditional 
law of breach of confidence in order to determine whether the 
information was “imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of 
confidence.”72  In such cases, the doctrine will be deployed in order to 
achieve the traditional objectives of giving effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the confider and confidant in such circumstances and 
preserving the commercial value of the confidential information 
disclosed to the confidant. 
The new doctrine of breach of confidence, freed from any 
requirement to establish that information has been confided in 
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, appears to be 
designed to apply in circumstances where the publication of sensitive 
personal information threatens to undermine the moral autonomy of the 
individual in question or is highly offensive to the moral sensibilities of 
a reasonable person in a similar situation.  On its facts, Campbell is a 
classic illustration of this problem.  The disclosure of, broadly speaking, 
private medical information undermines the freedom of the person 
needing assistance to seek appropriate medical advice and treatment.  
The disclosure of the sensitive medical information is also highly 
offensive to a reasonable person’s sense of dignity.  If it is correct to 
conclude that the new breach of confidence is a very different type of 
claim from the old breach of confidence, it seems very likely that 
referring to the two types of claims by the same label and treating one as 
simply a modification of the other is likely to be a source of continuing 
confusion of the two doctrines.  In theory at least, the confusion could 
run in either direction.  Thus, it is possible that a modern court applying 
the traditional doctrine will not insist on a strict finding that the 
traditional three elements of the traditional cause of action for breach of 
 
 70. DOUGLAS (NO. 3), supra note 29. 
 71. Campbell v. M.G.N., Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] A.C. 457. 
 72. Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd., [1968] F.S.R. 415, 419 (Ch.). 
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confidence are present in a particular fact situation.  This would 
undermine the capacity of the traditional doctrine to accomplish its 
objectives.  In the context of the new breach of confidence, courts may 
be inclined to restrict relief to situations that have some similarity to the 
traditional breach of confidence claim.  Thus, in Douglas, a passing 
reference was made by the court to the fact that both the unauthorized 
photographer and the defendant publisher must have been aware of the 
security arrangements concerning the wedding of Douglas and Zeta-
Jones and, accordingly, the private nature of the event.  In Campbell, it 
was said, the defendant publisher must have been aware that the 
information received from its informants would have been obtained in 
circumstances where Campbell would have expected that her 
participation would be treated as a confidential matter by all concerned.  
Although such circumstances bring these cases somewhat closer to the 
traditional breach of confidence paradigm, any such requirement would 
appear to be inconsistent with a modern claim designed to provide 
redress for invasions of privacy in the form of publication of sensitive 
and potentially embarrassing personal information.  In retrospect, it 
appears that the complete rejection by the House of Lords in Wainwright 
of American experience was an unfortunate turn of events.  A much 
more preferable course might have been to simply refuse recognition of 
the particular kind of privacy claim being advanced in Wainwright – 
invasive searches – and save to another day the question of whether 
other forms of privacy invasion, such as publication of personal 
information of a private nature, should be considered to be tortious.  
That day may yet come, of course.  In the interim, celebrities who, 
concerned by the highly intrusive practices of contemporary 
newsgathering agencies, seek redress under English law will be forced to 
“shoehorn”73 their claims into the second generation action for breach of 
confidence. 
 
 73. DOUGLAS (NO. 3), supra note  29, at 149. 
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